High Assurance Security Products on COTS Platforms by Blom, Rolf & Schwarz, Oliver
Legal notice:
This is the author version of an article published in ERCIM News (issue 102, July 2015)  within the special
theme "Trustworthy Systems of Systems". The publisher's version can be found at 
http://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en102/r-i/high-assurance-security-products-on-cots-platforms
High Assurance Security Products on COTS Platforms 
Rolf Blom, Senior Researcher in the Security Lab at SICS Swedish ICT
Oliver Schwarz, Researcher in the Security Lab at SICS Swedish ICT
With commodity operating systems failing to establish unbreakable isolation of processes, there is a 
need for stronger separation mechanisms. A recently launched open source project aims at applying 
virtualization to achieve such isolation on the widespread embedded ARM architectures. Strong 
assurance is established by formal verification and common criteria certification. Coexisting guest 
systems are able to run unmodified on the multicore platform, in a resource and cost efficient manner. 
The solution is rounded anchored in a secure boot process.
Today we see that governments, big organizations and authorities are increasingly starting to require 
independent verification (certification) of claimed security properties of deployed products and systems. 
For IT-solutions a well-established method is to use the Common Criteria (CC) (ISO 15408) framework 
and certify products according to defined and internationally recognized security requirements and 
assurance levels. The CC addresses protection of assets against unauthorized disclosure, modification, 
and loss of use.
The High Assurance Security Products on COTS (commercial of the shelf) Platforms project (HASPOC) is 
targeting a security solution for use in embedded systems, i.e. a trusted, cost and resource efficient 
virtualized commercial-off-the-shelf platform, which should have proven and Common Criteria certified 
security properties. The project is led by SICS Swedish ICT and carried out together with a consortium 
including Ericsson Research and KTH, the Royal Institute of Technology. The key feature offered by the 
platform is guaranteed isolation between different users and services running on it and their associated 
information. The isolation is provided by a formally security verified boot and hypervisor solution.  
Background on the design of a hypervisor for isolation can be found in [1].
The COTS platform selected for HASPOC is an ARMv8-A based multicore system on a chip of the form 
indicated in Figure 1. The HASPOC developed hypervisor takes advantage of the available hardware 
virtualization support (MMU, S-MMU, etc.) and is in principle a bare metal solution running essentially 
unmodified guests. The hypervisor will support Linux as guest OS. The solution will be released as open 
source; the boot solution under a GNU GPL v.2 license and the hypervisor code under an Apache v.2 
license.
Figure 1:  High level view of  HASPOC compliant system on a chip.
The platform security solution is supported by trust anchoring and boot solutions developed by project 
partner T2 Data. The hypervisor builds on the SICS Thin Hypervisor (STH) for ARMv7, which in a joint KTH-
SICS project PROSPER has been studied regarding the formal verification of its security claims (isolation 
properties). These existing solutions will be enhanced and modified to cover the new technology offered 
by the ARMv8 platform, product requirements and requirements for achieving high assurance level (EAL 
5/6) Common Criteria evaluations.  
The project will also produce baseline documents needed for a formal CC evaluation at EAL 6, i.e. a 
Security Target and supporting documentation needed in the evaluation process. The idea is that these 
baselines documents can be used as a starting point when a product based on the HASPOC platform 
should be CC certified. The project itself will not perform a formal CC evaluation as it will not develop a 
specific product.
In the formal verification process we create a mathematical and machine checkable proof that guests 
executing in coexistence on the HASPOC platform behave in the same way as if each guest runs on its 
own machine. This guarantees isolation relaxed by desired and controlled inter-guest communication. 
With hardware taking over more and more virtualization tasks, the formal verification of separation 
platforms departs from a pure software verification towards an integrated verification of hardware 
architectures, their isolation mechanisms and their interaction with software. The principles behind the 
formal verification work are described in [2].
Demonstrators in the secure communications area (encryption solutions with strict red/black separation) 
will be built within the project framework to test and demonstrate the efficiency and usability of the 
platform solution. This is an excellent test area as its security requirements are strict and high, while at 
the same time there is an increasing demand for new generations of High Assurance security products 
with increased functionality resulting in a corresponding need to find tools to enable agile product 
revisions. By the introduction of trusted components like the HASPOC platform in product development, 
a decrease in lead time from user requirement to developed, evaluated and deployed solution can be 
realized.
The developed technology will, in addition to specific security products like crypto equipment, secure 
mobile phones and firewalls, be applicable in a wide range of areas like SCADA systems, mobile 
communication networks, vehicular, avionics and medical systems, and also for devices in the Internet of 
Things (IoT).  Particularly interesting areas in the industrial sector are issues around mixing personal and 
enterprise information in the same user device (e.g. a laptop), cloud computing (allowing tenants to 
share pooled resources) etc.
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